Judicial Review Cannot Be Assumed by Executive in Absence of Explicit Law
Supreme Court held Revenue Officer cannot review 1971 vesting order without statutory power; Section 57A WBEA Act grants no review jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court in State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd. (2026), delivered a significant ruling concerning the scope of review powers of revenue authorities under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (WBEA Act) and the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (WBLR Act). The dispute centred on whether a Revenue Officer could reopen and review a vesting order passed in 1971, which had already attained finality, and whether the respondent company was entitled to retain agricultural land under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act.
The Court examined fundamental principles of administrative law, including the power of review that must be expressly conferred by statute, the limits of quasi-judicial authority, and the constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary.
Meaning and Scope of Judicial Review
Judicial review refers to the competence of constitutional courts to scrutinise actions of the legislature and executive for their legality, reasonableness, and constitutionality. In India, Articles 13, 32, 226, and 227 of the Constitution provide the framework for this supervisory jurisdiction.
The essence of judicial review lies in three objectives:
- Ensuring constitutional supremacy.
- Protecting fundamental rights.
- Maintaining checks and balances among the organs of the State.
Judicial review is, therefore, inherently a judicial function. It requires independence, adjudicatory competence, and insulation from executive influence. These attributes are absent in administrative authorities unless the legislature specifically confers such powers through a statute.
Facts of the Case
Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., incorporated in 1946, owned about 239 acres of land in Murshidabad, West Bengal, purchased partly before and partly after 1 January 1952. After the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 came into force, intermediary interests vested in the State, subject to limited retention under Section 6.
The company claimed benefit under Section 6(1)(j) asserting that it was exclusively engaged in farming and filed Form ‘B’ in 1956. In 1971, the Revenue Officer initiated proceedings to verify this claim but found that the company failed to produce any resolution, balance sheets, or evidence proving exclusive agricultural activity and held that the papers produced only showed some agricultural income, not exclusive farming. Consequently, about 205.44 acres were vested in the State, and only 25 acres were allowed to be retained.
The company’s writ challenge to this order was dismissed for default in 1975; restoration was rejected in 1987 and the appeal was dismissed in 2002, rendering the 1971 order final. However, in 2008, on the company’s representation seeking an “amicable settlement,” the Principal Secretary directed the BL&LRO to review the 1971 order. Acting on this, the officer reversed the vesting and allowed retention of 211.21 acres, which the Tribunal quashed, but the High Court restored, leading to the present appeal by the State.
Separation of Powers
Relying on Montesquieu and Indian constitutional jurisprudence, the Court warned that allowing Revenue Officers to review their own orders would:
- Undermine judicial independence.
- Destroy finality.
- Convert tribunals into parallel courts.
Power of Review Must Be Expressly Conferred
(a) Review Is Not an Inherent Power
A cardinal principle of administrative law is that review is not an inherent power. Unlike appellate jurisdiction, which may be implicit in hierarchical systems, review must be specifically granted.
In Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji (1971), the Supreme Court held:
“The power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication.”
Thus, unless a statute expressly provides for review, administrative authorities cannot reopen or reconsider their earlier decisions.
(b) Kalabharati Advertising Case
In Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania (2010), the Court declared:
“In the absence of any provision granting express power of review, an order passed in review is ultra vires, illegal and without jurisdiction.”
This judgment reaffirmed that executive bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions cannot sit in appeal over their own decisions without legislative sanction.
Executive Cannot Perform Judicial Functions
Distinction Between Administrative and Judicial Acts
Administrative decisions are policy-oriented and discretionary; judicial decisions involve adjudication of rights based on evidence and law. The two cannot be conflated.
If an executive officer reviews a concluded determination, it amounts to:
- Acting as a judge in one’s own cause.
- Violating principles of natural justice.
- Undermining the finality of decisions.
Finality of Administrative Adjudication
Once a quasi-judicial authority decides a matter, the principle of finality applies. Reopening such decisions without a statutory basis violates:
- Legal certainty
- Legitimate expectation
- Doctrine of functus officio
The Calcutta High Court in Satyanarayan Banerjee v. Charge Officer (1974), held that a successor revenue officer could not reopen an earlier order, as there was no statutory provision for review.
Key Highlights of the Decision
The Supreme Court observed:
"The power of review is essentially a core judicial function, and conferring such a power upon executive authorities, absent an express legislative mandate, would blur the constitutionally mandated demarcation between the executive and the judiciary, permit the executive authorities to sit in judgment over their own decisions, and erode the rule of law by diluting finality. Any contrary construction would, therefore, be inconsistent with legislative intent and would impermissibly encroach upon the basic structure of the Constitution."
Decision
The Supreme Court:
- Set aside the High Court judgment.
- Upheld the Tribunal’s order quashing the 2008 review;
- Declared the 2008 proceedings void ab initio;
- Restored the 1971 vesting order.
Conclusion
The judgment is a landmark affirmation that executive convenience cannot override statutory discipline. By nullifying the 2008 review, the Supreme Court preserved the integrity of land reform legislation and reinforced the constitutional boundary between executive administration and judicial functions. The ruling will guide future cases involving the reopening of concluded revenue proceedings and underscores that review is a judicial function, not an administrative privilege.
Important Link
Law Library: Notes and Study Material for LLB, LLM, Judiciary, and Entrance Exams
