When Direct Evidence Exists as a Dying Declaration, Is Motive Still Relevant?

In criminal jurisprudence, motive has traditionally been regarded as a crucial link in establishing guilt, particularly in cases that rely on circumstantial evidence. However, a recurring and critical question arises: when there is direct evidence in the form of a reliable dying declaration, does the prosecution still need to prove motive?

The Supreme Court of India squarely addressed this issue in its authoritative judgment dated 15 January 2026 in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, where the Court restored a conviction for murder that the High Court had overturned. The decision offers a lucid exposition of the law governing dying declarations, appellate interference with acquittals, and, most pertinently, the role of motive when direct evidence exists.

Factual Background of the Case

The prosecution case arose from a tragic matrimonial incident. On 7 December 2009, Saro Devi suffered extensive burn injuries at her matrimonial home in Chamba district, Himachal Pradesh. She was initially treated at the District Hospital, later referred to a medical college, and ultimately succumbed to her injuries on 15 January 2010.

The prosecution alleged that her husband, Chaman Lal, poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze after verbally abusing and humiliating her. On 8 December 2009, while undergoing treatment, Saro Devi made a statement before a Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate, which was treated as her dying declaration. In that statement, she clearly named her husband as the assailant and described the act leading to her burns.

The Sessions Court convicted the accused under Section 302 IPC (Section 103 BNS), relying primarily on the dying declaration. However, the High Court reversed the conviction, granting the benefit of doubt on grounds including alleged inconsistencies, doubts about the recording of the dying declaration, and absence of a clearly established motive.

The State appealed, leading to the Supreme Court’s decision restoring the conviction.

Trial before the Sessions Court

The Sessions Court framed a charge under Section 302 IPC (Section 103 BNS) against the respondent. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses, including:

• PW-1 (Tehsildar) who recorded the dying declaration,
• PW-2 (Brother of the deceased),
• PW-10 (Deputy Superintendent of Police) present during the recording of the dying declaration,
• PW-12 (Investigating Officer), and
• medical and formal witnesses.

The defence examined two witnesses, including the minor son of the deceased, who suggested that the respondent was not present at the time of the incident and that the deceased had set herself on fire.

The Sessions Court relied heavily on the dying declaration, finding it voluntary, reliable, and recorded in accordance with the law. The Court rejected the defence theory of self-immolation and convicted the respondent under Section 302 IPC. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of ₹50,000, with default imprisonment.

Appeal before the High Court

The respondent appealed against the conviction. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh, by judgment dated 26 August 2014, set aside the conviction and acquitted the respondent by extending the benefit of doubt.

The High Court primarily disbelieved the dying declaration on the following grounds:

1. Alleged inconsistencies regarding the time of recording of the dying declaration.
2. Doubt whether the Tehsildar actually recorded the statement or merely signed a statement prepared by police.
3. The presence of police officers during the recording of the dying declaration.
4. Reliance on testimonies of certain prosecution witnesses and defence witnesses suggesting self-immolation.
5. Absence of strong proof of motive.

Issues

1. Whether the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate was reliable and could form the basis of conviction.
2. Whether minor discrepancies regarding the timing and manner of recording the dying declaration rendered it doubtful.
3. Whether the presence of police officers at the time of recording the dying declaration vitiated its evidentiary value.
4. Whether the defence plea of self-immolation was probable.
5. Whether the High Court was justified in acquitting the accused by relying on hostile and defence witnesses.
6. Whether interference with the order of acquittal was warranted.

Findings of the Supreme Court

1. Validity and Reliability of the Dying Declaration

The Supreme Court held that the dying declaration was voluntary, truthful, and reliable. It was recorded by a competent Executive Magistrate after obtaining a medical opinion regarding the fitness of the deceased. The deceased was conscious, oriented, and capable of making a statement. The declaration clearly attributed the act of pouring kerosene and setting fire to the accused.

The Court observed that there was no evidence of tutoring, coercion, or manipulation. Therefore, the dying declaration was held to be a credible piece of direct evidence.

2. Effect of Minor Discrepancies

The Court held that minor inconsistencies regarding the time of recording of the dying declaration were trivial in nature. Such discrepancies were satisfactorily explained and did not go to the root of the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court emphasised that minor variations are natural and cannot outweigh substantive and consistent evidence.

3. Presence of Police Officers

The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the presence of police officers during the recording of the dying declaration vitiated its credibility. The statement was recorded by the Executive Magistrate, and there was no proof that the police influenced or dictated the statement. Mere presence of police officials, without evidence of interference, was held insufficient to discard the dying declaration.

4. FIR Not Naming the Accused

The Court held that the omission to name the accused in the FIR was not fatal to the prosecution's case. At the time of recording the FIR, the deceased had suffered extensive burns, and the immediate concern of the family was her survival. The FIR was not expected to contain every detail of the incident.

5. Defence Plea of Self-Immolation

The Supreme Court rejected the defence theory of self-immolation. The defence witnesses were found to be either interested, partisan, or lacking direct knowledge of the incident. None of them witnessed the act of burning. The minor burn injuries suffered by the accused were held to be consistent with post-incident conduct and did not exonerate him from criminal liability.

6. Reliance on Hostile and Defence Witnesses

The Court held that the High Court committed an error in placing undue reliance on hostile and defence witnesses whose testimonies were uncorroborated and inconsistent. The High Court ignored strong prosecution evidence, particularly the dying declaration, and instead relied on weak and unreliable defence evidence, amounting to misappreciation of evidence.

7. Proof of Motive

The Supreme Court held that proof of motive was not essential in the present case since there was direct evidence in the form of a reliable dying declaration. Nevertheless, evidence of marital discord and verbal abuse provided sufficient background for the offence.

8. Interference with Acquittal

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s acquittal was based on speculative reasoning and erroneous appreciation of evidence. The acquittal resulted in a miscarriage of justice, thereby warranting interference by the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court’s Clear Position on Motive

The Court relied on a consistent line of precedents, holding that:

Motive assumes significance, primarily in cases based on circumstantial evidence. Where there is direct evidence in the form of a credible and trustworthy dying declaration, the absence of strong proof of motive is not fatal to the prosecution case. This position has been consistently affirmed by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bogam Chandraiah and another, Dasin Bai @ Shanti Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, and Purshottam Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi). In the present case, the evidence on record discloses that the respondent subjected the deceased to frequent quarrels, humiliation and verbal abuse, including branding her a ‘Kanjri’ and repeatedly asking her to leave the matrimonial home.

The dying declaration itself refers to persistent matrimonial discord and ill-treatment thereby furnishing a plausible background for the commission of the offence. In any event, the prosecution is not required to establish motive with mathematical precision and failure to conclusively prove motive does not weaken an otherwise reliable and cogent case.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court clarified that when direct evidence exists in the form of a credible dying declaration (Section 32 IEA/ Section 26 BSA), motive loses its decisive relevance. While motive may lend contextual support, its absence cannot dilute direct proof of guilt.

By restoring the conviction, the Court reaffirmed a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence. Proof of the act, not speculation about the reason, lies at the heart of criminal liability. The judgment stands as a significant reaffirmation of the evidentiary value of dying declarations and serves as a caution against elevating motive to an unwarranted pedestal in criminal trials.

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