Allahabad HC Upholds Validity of Execution Plea Signed by Power of Attorney Holder Acquainted With Case Facts

In a significant pronouncement clarifying the procedural nuances under Order XXI Rules 10 and 11(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Santosh Jain & Ors. v. Kewal Kishore & Anr. (Matters Under Article 227 No. 9445 of 2025) reaffirmed that an execution application need not be signed personally by the decree-holder if it is signed and verified by a person acquainted with the facts of the case to the satisfaction of the court.

Justice Rohit Ranjan Agarwal dismissed the petition filed by the judgment-debtors challenging the maintainability of the execution plea, emphasising that procedural technicalities cannot override substantive justice—particularly where the person signing the execution application has long-standing and intimate knowledge of the case.

Factual Background

The litigation has a long history stretching back to the late 1970s. The dispute revolves around Shop No. 13/1091 in Bazar Fazalganj, Saharanpur, which was originally tenanted by one Late Aatma Ram.

The decree-holder, Kewal Kishore, had filed S.C.C. Suit No. 64 of 1978 for arrears of rent and ejectment. During the pendency of the suit, on 1 December 1981, Kewal Kishore executed a Power of Attorney (PoA) in favour of his father Gurudas Mal, authorising him to contest the case, file vakalatnamas, and manage the legal proceedings.

The suit was decreed on 13 August 1993, and subsequent appeals—including a Special Leave Petition (Civil Appeal No. 4433 of 1993) before the Supreme Court—were dismissed, thereby affirming the decree.

In 2002, the decree-holder initiated Execution Case No. 27 of 2002, seeking possession of the tenanted premises. Over the years, as the original judgment-debtor and his son (Pradeep Kumar Jain) passed away, the petitioners were substituted as their legal heirs in 2017.

The petitioners then filed an application under Section 47 read with Section 151 CPC, objecting to the execution proceedings. They contended that the execution application was invalid since it was signed by the Power of Attorney holder rather than the decree-holder himself.

This objection triggered a series of proceedings across various forums—each time reaffirming the validity of the execution process. After successive dismissals at the level of the executing court and the revisional court, the matter reached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Issue

The central issue before the Allahabad High Court was:

• Whether an execution application under Order XXI Rule 10 CPC must mandatorily be signed by the decree-holder himself, or whether it can be validly signed and verified by a Power of Attorney holder or any other person acquainted with the case facts?

The petitioners argued that the language of Rule 10—specifically the use of the word “shall”—rendered the requirement mandatory. Therefore, they claimed, only the decree-holder himself could move the execution application.

Conversely, the respondents maintained that Rule 10 and Rule 11(2) must be read harmoniously. They emphasised that Rule 11(2) expressly allows “some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case” to sign and verify the application.

Contentions of the Petitioners

Strict Interpretation of “Shall” in Rule 10:

The petitioners asserted that Rule 10 of Order XXI uses mandatory language, meaning the decree-holder “shall apply” to the court for execution. According to them, this precludes the delegation of this right to any other person.

Limited Scope of Power of Attorney:

They argued that the PoA granted to Gurudas Mal in 1981 was restricted to the suit stage and did not extend to execution proceedings, which are separate under the law.

Defect Not Curable:

Since the Power of Attorney did not authorise representation in execution, the defect in the signature of the application was argued to be incurable.

Reliance on Precedents:

The petitioners cited:

Karnataka Housing Board v. K.A. Nagamani, Civil Appeal No. 4631 of 2019, where the Supreme Court observed that execution proceedings are distinct from original suits.

Dastagir Hussain Nadaf v. Maharashtra Apex Corporation Ltd., 1986 Supreme (Kar) 341, to support the argument that an unauthorised PoA cannot initiate execution.

Contentions of the Respondents

Continuity and Acquaintance:

Counsel for the decree-holder stressed that Gurudas Mal had been handling the matter for over four decades and was fully acquainted with the case. His long-standing involvement made him a “person proved to the satisfaction of the court” under Rule 11(2).

Harmonious Construction of Rules 10 and 11(2):

The respondents urged that the two provisions are complementary, not contradictory. The execution application can be made by the decree-holder or another person familiar with the case.

Delay and Abuse of Process:

The objection was termed as a tactical delay to stall the execution of a decree that had attained finality way back in 2000.

Supportive Precedents:

The respondents relied on:

• Kopargaon Big Bagayatkar Vividha Karyakari Sahakari Society Ltd. v. Deorao Sakharam Pawar, AIR 1976 Bom 333,
• Ghulam Navi Seh v. Gaffer Wagey, AIR 1983 J&K 67, both supporting a liberal interpretation that allows persons acquainted with the case to represent the decree-holder.

Court’s Observations and Reasoning

Justice Rohit Ranjan Agarwal began by examining Rules 10 and 11(2) of Order XXI CPC, which together govern the manner in which execution applications must be presented.

1. Textual Interpretation of the Provisions

The Court reproduced both provisions, emphasising that Rule 10 prescribes who can apply for execution, while Rule 11(2) prescribes how the application must be made.

Rule 10 provides:

“Where the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the Court which passed the decree…”

Rule 11(2) states:

“…every application for the execution of a decree shall be in writing, signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case.”

The Court held that these two provisions must be read together, as they are complementary, not mutually exclusive.

“From the reading of Rule 10 and Rule 11(2), it is amply clear that they are complementary to each other and in no way restrict or curtail the provisions contained therein.”

2. Harmonious Construction and Legislative Intent

The Court rejected the petitioners’ literal interpretation of “shall,” holding that procedural law must be interpreted to advance justice, not defeat it.

Rule 11(2) expressly broadens the scope by allowing “some other person acquainted with the facts” to sign and verify the application, subject to the court’s satisfaction. This flexibility ensures that decrees are not frustrated due to technical or formal defects.

3. Verification in Execution vs. Pleadings

The Court drew a clear distinction between verification of pleadings under Order VI Rule 15 and verification of execution applications under Order XXI Rule 11(2).

It cited the Delhi High Court in International Security and Intelligence Agency Ltd. v. MCD, AIR 2002 Delhi 347, which held that execution petitions, being in tabular form, differ substantially from pleadings requiring paragraph-wise verification.

“The verification of a pleading and execution of a decree cannot be placed on the same pedestal… It is the satisfaction of the Court which is material for the purpose of accepting or rejecting verification.”

4. Satisfaction of the Court as Key Criterion

The Court underscored that the determining factor is the satisfaction of the executing court that the person signing the application is acquainted with the facts.

Since Gurudas Mal had been conducting proceedings since 1981 and was well-versed with every stage of litigation, his signing of the execution plea satisfied the statutory requirement.

5. Rejection of Technical Objections

Justice Agarwal noted that execution proceedings had been pending for over two decades, and repeated objections were merely dilatory tactics to prevent enforcement of the decree.

The Court held that such hyper-technical objections are contrary to the spirit of justice, especially when the decree had already attained finality at all appellate levels, including the Supreme Court.

Reference to the Supreme Court’s Observations on the Delay in Execution

To reinforce the urgency of completing execution proceedings, the Allahabad High Court cited the Supreme Court’s observations in Periyammal v. Rajamani, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 507, which reiterated the guidelines laid down in Rahul S. Shah v. Jitendra Kumar Gandhi [(2021) 6 SCC 418].

The Apex Court had mandated that execution proceedings should ordinarily be disposed of within six months, and frivolous objections under Section 47 CPC should be discouraged.

Justice Agarwal emphasised that this case, where the decree dated back to 1993, exemplified the kind of inordinate delay that the Supreme Court sought to prevent.

Court’s Decision

After examining the arguments and legal provisions, the Allahabad High Court held:

1. Execution application signed by Power of Attorney holder valid: Since Gurudas Mal, father of the decree-holder, was fully acquainted with the facts, his signature satisfied the requirements of Order XXI Rule 11(2).
2. No procedural irregularity: Both the executing court and the revisional court rightly rejected the objections. There was no error warranting interference under Article 227.
3. Direction for Expeditious Disposal: Recognising the prolonged pendency, the High Court directed the Executing Court to decide Execution Case No. 27 of 2002 within two months in line with Supreme Court directions in Rahul S. Shah.

Thus, the writ petition was dismissed.

Key Takeaways from the Judgment

1. Harmonious Reading of Rules 10 and 11(2): The provisions are complementary. While Rule 10 identifies the applicant, Rule 11(2) prescribes procedural requirements, allowing representation by another person acquainted with the facts.
2. Power of Attorney Holder’s Role: A Power of Attorney holder who has long managed litigation can validly initiate execution proceedings, provided the court is satisfied with his familiarity with the case.
3. Purpose Over Form: The judgment underscores that procedure is the handmaid of justice, not its mistress. Technical objections should not frustrate lawful decrees.
4. Delay in Execution Discouraged: The Court’s reliance on Rahul S. Shah and Periyammal reiterates that execution petitions must be completed promptly—preferably within six months.
5. Verification Standard: Verification in execution proceedings differs from pleadings; the key consideration is the court’s satisfaction rather than strict compliance with the formality of signature by the decree-holder.

Conclusion

Allahabad High Court’s decision in Smt. Santosh Jain & Ors. v. Kewal Kishore & Anr. reinforces a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach to procedural law. By validating the execution application signed by the decree-holder’s Power of Attorney holder, the Court reaffirmed that the substance of justice outweighs technical formalities.

As the decree dated back to 1993 and had survived multiple rounds of appeal, the Court’s insistence on expeditious disposal resonates with the judiciary’s broader goal of ensuring that litigation ends in effective enforcement, not perpetual delay.

In essence, the ruling underscores a timeless legal principle —

“Procedure must serve justice, not stifle it.”

Important Link

Law Library: Notes and Study Material for LLB, LLM, Judiciary, and Entrance Exams