Can Condonation of Delay Be Claimed as a Matter of Right?

Limitation law occupies a unique position in the administration of justice. While substantive rights define the scope of legal entitlements, limitation statutes determine the time within which such rights must be asserted. The doctrine of limitation is rooted in public policy; it seeks to ensure finality in litigation, prevent stale claims, and promote diligence among litigants. At the same time, courts are often confronted with situations where rigid adherence to limitation periods may defeat substantial justice.

To reconcile these competing considerations, the law provides for condonation of delay, enabling courts to excuse delay where “sufficient cause” is shown. However, an important and recurring question arises: can condonation of delay be claimed as a matter of right?

This question has assumed renewed significance following the Supreme Court’s authoritative reiteration in State of Odisha & Ors. v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School (2026 INSC 148), where the Court emphatically held that condonation of delay is not a vested right but a discretionary relief. 

Case Background

The Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School approached the State Education Tribunal, Bhubaneswar under Section 24-B of the Odisha Education Act, 1969, seeking release of grant-in-aid for its teaching and non-teaching staff. By an order dated 30 December 2013, the Tribunal allowed the claim and directed the State of Odisha to release the grant-in-aid.

The State of Odisha filed an appeal before the Orissa High Court on 16 October 2015, but the appeal was time-barred and not accompanied by a certified copy of the Tribunal’s order. Despite this defect, the State took no steps to cure it for nearly eight years, leading the High Court to dismiss the appeal on 26 April 2023.

Thereafter, the State obtained the certified copy in February 2024 and filed applications seeking recall of the dismissal order and condonation of delay. The High Court found that the delay was effectively over 11 years and rejected the applications on 21 February 2025 for want of sufficient cause.

The State then approached the Supreme Court, but its Special Leave Petition was itself delayed. Dismissing the petition as time-barred, the Supreme Court held that condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right and reaffirmed that it is a discretionary relief dependent on a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

Statutory Framework: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

The principal statutory provision governing condonation of delay is Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which states:

“Any appeal or any application… may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”

Two elements of this provision are critical:

1. Use of the word “may” – indicating discretion, not compulsion.
2. Burden on the applicant – to “satisfy the court” that sufficient cause exists.

The statute, therefore, does not confer an enforceable entitlement to condonation. It merely enables the court to relax limitation norms where justice so demands. The discretion is judicial, not automatic.

Concept of “Sufficient Cause”: Elastic but Not Boundless

The expression “sufficient cause” has intentionally been left undefined by the legislature. Courts have consistently held that it must receive a liberal construction, but not an unlimited one. The elasticity of the expression allows courts to account for human conduct, procedural complexities, and bona fide mistakes. However, this elasticity does not convert discretion into obligation.

Importantly, courts have distinguished between:

• Explanation – a bona fide, reasonable account of delay; and
• Excuse – a vague, mechanical, or negligent justification.

Only the former can constitute “sufficient cause.”

Early Liberal Approach: Justice-Oriented Interpretation

Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji (1987)

The Supreme Court in Katiji laid the foundation for a justice-oriented approach, particularly in cases involving the State. The Court emphasised that procedural technicalities should not override substantial justice and famously observed that no litigant stands to benefit from filing an appeal late.

This judgment introduced six guiding principles, including:

• A pragmatic approach to delay.
• Rejection of pedantic reasoning;
• Preference for decisions on merits over technical dismissal.

G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer (1988)

Building upon Katiji, the Court acknowledged the institutional nature of governmental decision-making, observing that bureaucratic procedures often entail unavoidable delays. The Court permitted a degree of latitude to the State, recognising that public interest may suffer if governmental appeals are dismissed on technical grounds alone.

However, even at this stage, the Court did not suggest that the State had a right to condonation, only that courts could be less rigid where sufficient cause was shown.

Emerging Judicial Concern: Limits of Liberalism

Within a few years, judicial optimism began to wane. The Supreme Court started expressing concern that liberal condonation was being misused to legitimise administrative apathy.

Amateur Riders Club Case (1994)

In a significant shift, the Court warned that there exists a threshold beyond which even courts cannot assist the Government. It condemned stereotyped affidavits and bureaucratic indifference, holding that latitude cannot become a licence for negligence.

This marked the first clear articulation that governmental status does not immunise a litigant from the operation of limitation law.

Shift Towards Strict Scrutiny (2010 onwards)

Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012)

This judgment decisively altered the trajectory of limitation jurisprudence. The Court refused to condone a delay of 427 days by a government department, holding that:

• The law of limitation binds everyone equally;
• Government departments cannot rely on procedural red tape as a routine excuse;
• Casual delay undermines rule of law.

The Court categorically rejected the argument that the State deserves automatic indulgence.

University of Delhi v. Union of India (2020)

A three-judge bench reaffirmed this strict approach by refusing to condone an extraordinary delay of over 900 days. The Court clarified that public interest does not justify perpetual indifference to limitation periods.

Clarification of Principle: Merits Are Irrelevant at the Delay Stage

Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (2024)

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that:

• Limitation law is founded on public policy;
• Merits of the case cannot be examined at the stage of condonation;
• Courts must only assess whether sufficient cause for delay exists.

This reinforced that condonation is not a backdoor mechanism to revive otherwise time-barred claims.

The 2026 Supreme Court Decision: Definitive Restatement

In State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School (2026), the Supreme Court was confronted with extreme governmental lethargy. The State had:

• Filed a time-barred appeal without a certified copy;
• Failed to cure defects for over eight years;
• Approached the Supreme Court with further unexplained delay.

Rejecting the plea for condonation, the Court held:

“Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone delay.”

Condonation as Discretion, Not Right

From the statutory language and consistent judicial pronouncements, the following principles clearly emerge:

1. No vested right exists to seek condonation of delay.
2. Delay does not stand condoned by default; it requires a reasoned judicial order.
3. The burden lies entirely on the applicant to establish sufficient cause.
4. Discretion must be exercised judiciously, not mechanically or sympathetically.
5. Length of delay is relevant, though not decisive, for longer delays.

Conclusion

The jurisprudence on condonation of delay has evolved from compassionate flexibility to principled restraint. While courts remain empowered to condone genuine and bona fide delays in the interest of justice, such indulgence is neither automatic nor claimable as a matter of right.

The 2026 Supreme Court ruling firmly cements this position by reaffirming that discretion, not entitlement, lies at the heart of condonation jurisprudence. The message is unambiguous: procedural law may bend for justice, but it will not break for indifference.

Condonation of delay is a privilege granted by the court, not a right demanded by the litigant.

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