Can Contempt Jurisdiction Be Used as a Shield for Judges Against Criticism?
Supreme Court overturns contempt sentence, stressing that judicial criticism is not contempt unless malicious; accepts appellant’s sincere apology.
The contempt jurisdiction of courts—especially when exercised against citizens, activists, lawyers, or media—is one of the most debated areas of Indian constitutional law. Supporters argue that it is necessary to preserve the dignity of courts and ensure the uninterrupted administration of justice. Critics, however, fear that contempt powers may operate as a tool to stifle dissent, silence criticism, and shield judges from public scrutiny.
This debate has recently been revived by a significant Supreme Court judgment delivered on 10 December 2025 in Vineeta Srinandan v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Criminal Appeal No. 2267 of 2025).
Constitutional Authority and Statutory Framework of Contempt Jurisdiction in India
Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution vest the Supreme Court and High Courts with the inherent power to punish for contempt, ensuring the dignity and smooth functioning of the judicial system. This constitutional mandate is supplemented by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which categorises contempt into two types: civil contempt, referring to the wilful disobedience of court orders, and criminal contempt, which includes any act that scandalises or tends to scandalise the court, interferes with judicial proceedings, or obstructs the administration of justice.
Among these, the most debated is Section 2(c)—particularly the provision relating to “scandalising the authority of the court”—because of its potential impact on free speech and criticism in a democratic society.
Supreme Court’s 2025 Intervention: Reorienting the Ethics of Contempt Jurisdiction
In Vineeta Srinandan, the Supreme Court heard an appeal against the Bombay High Court order passed for making allegations of judicial bias in a circular.
Before addressing the merits of the case, the Supreme Court laid down a profound ethical framework for understanding contempt powers. Justice Vikram Nath observed:
“The power to punish necessarily carries within it the concomitant power to forgive… Courts must remain conscious that this power is not a personal armour for Judges, nor a sword to silence criticism.”
This pronouncement reframes contempt jurisdiction as a tool of institutional integrity rather than personal protection. The Court’s emphasis on restraint underscores that contempt powers cannot be invoked merely to shield judges from uncomfortable or unflattering commentary. Instead, these powers exist to safeguard the administration of justice—not to insulate the judiciary from democratic scrutiny or dissent.
Vineeta Srinandan v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay
Background
The appellant, a former Director of Seawoods Estates Ltd., had issued a circular criticising the High Court’s approach to stray dog litigation. The circular contained strong accusations, including references to a supposed “dog mafia” influencing judges.
The High Court took suo motu cognizance and initiated criminal contempt proceedings.
The High Court’s Reasoning
The Bombay High Court convicted the appellant because of the circular:
- Scandalised the court,
- Lowered the authority of the judiciary,
- Interfered with pending proceedings, and
- It was written intentionally to disrepute the judicial system.
The Court also rejected her apology, calling it perfunctory and lacking in genuine remorse. Relying on earlier precedents, it sentenced the appellant to one week of simple imprisonment and imposed a fine of ₹2,000.
Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court examined whether the conviction and refusal to accept the appellant’s apology were legally sustainable. While agreeing that the circular satisfied the ingredients of criminal contempt, the Court disagreed with the High Court’s approach in sentencing.
The Court noted that the appellant had promptly filed an unconditional and unqualified apology, which the High Court acknowledged but rejected on the ground that it lacked genuine remorse. The Supreme Court emphasised that Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act not only prescribes punishment but also expressly empowers courts to discharge the contemnor or remit the sentence where a sincere apology is made. The Explanation to Section 12 clarifies that even a qualified apology cannot be rejected if it is bona fide.
The Court further found that the High Court had incorrectly relied on earlier decisions such as Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, Roshan Lal Ahuja, In Re, Rajendra Sail v. M.P. High Court Bar Association, and Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra. In those cases, the contemnors had either refused to apologise, withdrawn their apology, or levelled allegations of extreme gravity—circumstances materially different from the present case.
The Court reiterated that the ratio of earlier judgments must be applied only where the factual matrix is comparable, citing Royal Medical Trust v. Union of India and Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi to emphasise the need for contextual and fact-specific interpretation.
Given that the appellant had shown immediate, unconditional remorse, and there was no evidence to suggest her apology was insincere, the Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its contempt jurisdiction with the required degree of circumspection.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court concluded that:
- The High Court’s reliance on earlier contempt precedents was misplaced, as the facts were distinguishable.
- The appellant had demonstrated genuine remorse, fulfilling the requirements for leniency under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
Accordingly, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and remitted the punishment, allowing the appeal.
Conclusion
Contempt jurisdiction can never be a shield for judges against criticism. The Supreme Court’s 2025 judgment firmly reiterates that the power to punish contempt is not meant to protect judges from discomfort, dissent, or disagreement. Instead, it is designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process—not the personal prestige of its officers.
A democracy thrives on open debate, informed criticism, and the freedom to question those who wield public power. Judges, entrusted with upholding constitutional values, must remain open to scrutiny and refrain from invoking contempt except where criticism crosses the line into deliberate obstruction or malicious scandalisation.
As India’s legal system evolves, the judiciary must continue fostering a legal culture where respect is earned not by shielding judges from critique, but by ensuring transparency, humility, accountability, and unwavering commitment to justice.
Important Link
Law Library: Notes and Study Material for LLB, LLM, Judiciary, and Entrance Exams
