Doctrine of Pleasure: Meaning, Constitutional Basis and Judicial Interpretation
An in-depth look at the Doctrine of Pleasure, balancing executive power and civil service protection under Indian constitutional law.

The Doctrine of Pleasure is a foundational principle of public service jurisprudence that governs the tenure of civil servants under the State. Rooted in English constitutional law and subsequently adapted into the Indian constitutional framework, the doctrine embodies the idea that certain public offices are held at the “pleasure” of the sovereign authority. In India, this doctrine has been constitutionalised under Article 310 of the Constitution, subject to important safeguards provided by Article 311 and judicial interpretation.
While the doctrine originally conferred unfettered power on the Crown in England to dismiss servants at will, its application in India reflects a carefully balanced approach between executive authority, rule of law, and protection of civil servants against arbitrary action. The Indian Constitution does not adopt the doctrine in its absolute form; instead, it modifies and restrains it through constitutional limitations, procedural safeguards, and evolving judicial scrutiny.
Origin and Historical Background
English Law Origin
The Doctrine of Pleasure traces its origins to English common law, where civil servants held office at the pleasure of the Crown. The rationale was based on the monarch’s sovereignty and the need for loyalty and confidence in those administering public affairs. Under this doctrine:
- No civil servant had a contractual right to continue in service
- Dismissal could be effected without assigning reasons
- Courts had limited or no jurisdiction over such dismissals
The doctrine was articulated in cases such as Shenton v. Smith (1895), where the Privy Council observed that Crown servants hold office during pleasure and cannot claim damages for dismissal.
Adoption in India During Colonial Rule
In British India, the doctrine was incorporated into service jurisprudence. Section 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1919 and later Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 introduced limited safeguards against arbitrary dismissal, laying the foundation for Articles 310 and 311 of the Indian Constitution.
Constitutional Basis of the Doctrine of Pleasure in India
Article 310: Pleasure of the President and Governor
Article 310(1) of the Constitution of India provides:
“Except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence service or of a civil service of the Union or of an all-India service or holds any post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union, holds office during the pleasure of the President; and every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State.”
This provision constitutionalises the doctrine but makes it expressly subject to other constitutional provisions, most notably Article 311.
Nature of Pleasure Under Indian Constitution
The “pleasure” under Article 310 is:
- Not personal to the President or Governor
- Exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers
- Subject to constitutional limitations and judicial review
Thus, unlike English law, the doctrine in India is not absolute or arbitrary.
Article 311: Constitutional Safeguards to the Doctrine
Purpose of Article 311
Article 311 acts as a protective shield for civil servants against the unrestrained application of the Doctrine of Pleasure. It introduces procedural fairness and ensures security of tenure.
Key Safeguards Under Article 311
1) Authority Competence [Article 311(1)]
A civil servant cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed him.
2) Reasonable Opportunity of Hearing [Article 311(2)]
No dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank can be imposed without:
- Informing the employee of charges.
- Giving a reasonable opportunity to defend.
These safeguards uphold principles of natural justice, particularly audi alteram partem.
Exceptions to Article 311(2)
Article 311(2) itself provides three exceptions where the opportunity of hearing may be dispensed with:
- Conviction on a Criminal Charge: Where dismissal follows a conviction by a criminal court.
- Impracticability of Holding Inquiry: Where it is not reasonably practicable to conduct an inquiry (e.g., breakdown of law and order).
- Security of the State: Where the President or Governor is satisfied that holding an inquiry would be against the interest of state security.
These exceptions represent areas where administrative exigency overrides procedural safeguards, but even here, judicial scrutiny is not entirely excluded.
Judicial Interpretation of the Doctrine of Pleasure
Indian courts have played a crucial role in humanising and constitutionalising the Doctrine of Pleasure.
State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid (1954)
The Supreme Court rejected the English position that civil servants cannot sue for wrongful dismissal. It held that Indian civil servants have enforceable rights under the Constitution.
Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985)
This landmark judgment clarified:
- The scope of exceptions under Article 311(2).
- The meaning of “not reasonably practicable”.
- That satisfaction of the President or Governor is subject to judicial review, though on limited grounds.
The Court emphasised that the Doctrine of Pleasure cannot be exercised arbitrarily.
Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974)
The Supreme Court held that:
- The President and Governor are constitutional heads, not personal authorities.
- Their pleasure is exercised on ministerial advice.
- The doctrine does not grant personal or unfettered discretion.
B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010)
Though related to the removal of Governors, the Court laid down an important principle:
- Even where the Constitution provides for holding office “during pleasure”, such pleasure cannot be exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or mala fide.
This reasoning reinforces the limited nature of the doctrine across constitutional offices.
Doctrine of Pleasure and Contractual Employment
The doctrine applies primarily to civil posts under the State. It does not automatically govern:
- Employees of statutory corporations
- Public sector undertakings
- Contractual or temporary employees
Courts have consistently held that where service conditions are governed by statutory rules or contracts, the Doctrine of Pleasure operates only to the extent permitted by law.
Relationship with Fundamental Rights
Article 14: Equality and Non-Arbitrariness
Any exercise of pleasure must satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness under Article 14. Arbitrary dismissal violates equality before law.
Article 21: Due Process and Dignity
Dismissal without fair procedure can impact livelihood, which has been recognised as part of the right to life under Article 21. Thus, procedural fairness is constitutionally mandated.
Doctrine of Pleasure and All-India Services
Members of All-India Services (IAS, IPS, IFS) are also governed by the doctrine, but their service conditions are heavily regulated by statutory rules. The Central Administrative Tribunal and High Courts play a key role in ensuring protection against arbitrary action.
Conclusion
The Doctrine of Pleasure in India is no longer an absolute or arbitrary principle, but a constitutionally regulated mechanism harmonised with the rule of law. While Article 310 preserves executive authority, Articles 311, 14, and 21 ensure that such authority is exercised with fairness, reasonableness, and accountability.
Judicial interpretation has transformed the doctrine from a symbol of sovereign absolutism into a constitutionally disciplined power, balancing administrative efficiency with protection of civil servants’ rights. In its evolved form, the doctrine continues to play a vital role in public administration while remaining firmly anchored to constitutional morality.
References
- State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, 1954 INSC 13
- Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398
- Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192
- B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, 2010 (4) AWC 3617 (SC)
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