Supreme Court: No Constitutional Basis for Deemed Assent; Timelines Cannot Be Imposed

In a landmark advisory opinion delivered in In re: Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India (Special Reference No. 1 of 2025), the Supreme Court of India has clarified the constitutional position relating to the powers of Governors and the President under Articles 200 and 201. The judgment, running more than 100 pages, addresses fundamental questions concerning federalism, separation of powers, and the functioning of constitutional authorities. Significantly, the Court rejected the idea of deemed assent—a concept that had been invoked in political and judicial commentary—and held that neither the Governor nor the President can be subjected to judicially imposed timelines for exercising their constitutional functions.

The Court’s ruling is the result of a Presidential Reference made under Article 143(1), following widespread disagreements between several States and Governors over delayed assent to Bills. The President sought clarity on fourteen questions relating to:

• the options available to the Governor under Article 200,
• whether timelines can be mandated,
• whether deemed assent exists,
• the justiciability of decisions under Articles 200 and 201, and
• the scope of Article 142 in matters touching executive discretion.

By authoritatively resolving these issues, the Supreme Court has provided essential guidance on legislative processes, Centre–State relations, and the limits of judicial power.

Background: The Presidential Reference

On 13 May 2025, the President of India made a reference under Article 143(1) requesting the Supreme Court’s opinion on vital constitutional questions affecting the functioning of the Governor and the President in the legislative process. The backdrop included serious disagreements between the Union and States about delayed assent, alleged inaction, and excessive discretion exercised by Governors.

The Court observed that the questions were of “foundational importance” and directly impacted the “day-to-day functioning of constitutional machinery.”

The Bench noted that the matter touched upon the stability of federal governance and the relationship between elected State governments and the Governor, an unelected constitutional functionary.

The Court therefore chose to answer the Reference comprehensively, treating it as a “functional reference” relating to the working mechanisms of governance, rather than as a purely abstract or hypothetical advisory exercise.

Constitutional Scheme: Articles 200 and 201

Article 200 – Assent to State Bills

Article 200 provides that once a Bill is passed by the State Legislature, it must be presented to the Governor. The Governor has three textual options:

1. Assent to the Bill,
2. Withhold assent, or
3. Reserve the Bill for consideration of the President.

The first proviso adds that the Governor may return a Bill (other than a Money Bill) with a message recommending reconsideration. If the Legislature again passes the Bill, the Governor “shall not withhold assent.”

The second proviso mandates that if the Bill endangers the position of the High Courts, the Governor must reserve it for the President.

Article 201 – Assent to Reserved Bills

When a Bill is reserved, the President may:

• give assent, or
• withhold assent.

Notably, Article 201 does not contain a proviso similar to Article 200, and does not contain a direction requiring the President to return a Bill.

Key Issue 1: Are Governors Allowed to Sit on Bills Indefinitely?

Many States argued that long delays by Governors defeat the democratic mandate and allow unelected authorities to obstruct legislation. Some High Courts, including the Madras High Court, had held that Governors must act “as soon as possible.”

The Supreme Court acknowledged the problem of delays but refused to impose judicial timelines. It held that:

• The Constitution does not specify any time limits for the Governor or the President.
• Courts cannot judicially legislate such timelines.
• Introducing timelines would amount to rewriting the Constitution.

Reasoning

1. Textual Silence Is Deliberate: The framers deliberately omitted time limits. Judicial insertion of timelines would amount to a constitutional amendment.
2. Separation of Powers: Courts cannot compel constitutional authorities to act within a specific time when the Constitution does not prescribe one.
3. Polycentric Considerations: Articles 200 and 201 involve multiple factors—federalism, national security, uniformity of laws—which cannot be rushed through court-mandated deadlines.

The Court emphasised that although “inordinate delays are undesirable,” the remedy must come from constitutional conventions or parliamentary intervention, not from judicial directions.

Key Issue 2: No Constitutional Basis for “Deemed Assent”

One of the most debated questions was whether the Constitution permits deemed assent—i.e., whether a Bill automatically becomes law if the Governor or the President fails to act within a reasonable time.

The Supreme Court’s answer was unequivocal:

“The concept of deemed assent is alien to the constitutional scheme.”

Why the Court Rejected Deemed Assent

1. No textual support: The Constitution makes assent a positive declaratory act—there must be an express declaration by the Governor or the President.
2. Legislative drafting history: The Constituent Assembly removed provisions resembling deemed assent from earlier drafts. The final text requires explicit action.
3. Dangerous for federalism: Automatic assent would override the President’s role in ensuring national uniformity on crucial subjects, particularly when Bills trench upon Union List matters.
4. Contradicts the mandatory reservation under the second proviso to Article 200: If deemed assent existed, Governors would be deprived of a constitutionally mandatory duty to reserve certain Bills.

A Bill becomes law only when:

• the Governor assents; or
• the President assents (for reserved Bills); or
• the Legislature passes it again after reconsideration, and the Governor must assent.

No other route exists.

Key Issue 3: What Options Are Actually Available to the Governor?

The Court clarified that Article 200 does not give the Governor four separate options (assent, withhold, return, reserve). Instead, it held that:

The Governor has three options:

1. Assent,
2. Reserve the Bill, or
3. Withhold, but only in the qualified sense through returning the Bill under the first proviso.

The Governor cannot withhold assent simpliciter.

This is because:

• The first proviso qualifies the power of withholding;
• The Governor must return the Bill with a message—except for Money Bills;
• A Money Bill cannot be returned under the proviso, which means it cannot be withheld either;
• Therefore, the Governor must either assent or reserve in case of Money Bills.

This interpretation, the Court held, preserves democratic accountability and prevents the Governor from acting as a parallel legislature.

Key Issue 4: Is the Governor Bound by the Aid and Advice of the Council of Ministers?

The Court confirmed the long-standing principle that:

The Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers for all options under Article 200, except where the Constitution expressly provides discretion.

This is consistent with:

• Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab
• Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker

Exception: The second proviso

Where a Bill derogates from High Court powers, the Governor must independently reserve it, since the Constitution explicitly mandates it.

Key Issue 5: Are Decisions of the Governor and President Justiciable?

The Union argued that the exercise of discretion under Articles 200 and 201 is non-justiciable. States argued that judicial review is permissible in cases of malafides or constitutional abuse.

The Court struck a careful balance:

• The content of a pending Bill cannot be judicially reviewed.
• But the process followed by the Governor or the President can be reviewed.
• Courts can ensure that constitutional limits are respected, but cannot direct outcomes.

Thus:

• Courts cannot force the Governor to give assent.
• Courts can compel the Governor to consider the Bill and act constitutionally.

This approach preserves the basic structure doctrine—particularly the separation of powers and constitutional supremacy.

Key Issue 6: Can Article 142 Be Used to Compel Assent or Impose Timelines?

The Court held firmly:

• No. Article 142 cannot be used to override constitutional provisions or to substitute the constitutional role of the Governor or President.

The power under Article 142 is supplementary and cannot be used to:

• rewrite Article 200 or 201,
• impose time deadlines,
• direct withdrawal of bills,
• direct assent to bills, or
• create a doctrine of deemed assent.

This ensures that Article 142 remains a tool of “complete justice,” not a vehicle for judicial overreach.

Key Issue 7: Federalism as a Guiding Principle

The Court repeatedly emphasised:

• Indian Constitution is federal with a strong Union.
• The Governor's power to reserve Bills protects national uniformity and constitutional supremacy.
• The President ensures that States do not legislate beyond their powers.

Thus, timelines or deemed assent mechanisms could weaken federal balance.

Key Takeaways of the Judgment

1. No deemed assent: A Bill cannot become law without explicit assent.
2. No judicially mandated timelines: Courts cannot impose deadlines on Governors or the President.
3. Only three options for the Governor: Assent, reserve, or return (qualified withholding).
4. Governor must follow aid and advice: Except in mandatory reservation cases.
5.  Judicial review is limited: Process review is allowed; outcome review is not.
6. Article 142 cannot be used to circumvent constitutional design: No judicial legislation of timelines or assent obligations.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s advisory opinion provides much-needed clarity on constitutional mechanics relating to the functioning of Governors and the President in the legislative process. By firmly rejecting deemed assent and refusing to impose timelines, the Court has reinforced the primacy of the constitutional text and preserved the delicate balance between democratic accountability, federalism, and separation of powers.

At the same time, the Court acknowledged the real concerns posed by inordinate delays and underscored that constitutional authorities are expected to act responsibly and promptly. The solution, however, must come from constitutional culture and political maturity—not from judicial amendment of the Constitution.

This ruling thus stands as a significant reaffirmation of constitutional boundaries, ensuring that the legislative process remains governed by clear, consistent, and democratically grounded principles.

Important Link

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