Daughter remains a coparcener by birth. Oral partition without legal proof cannot bar her share under the Hindu Succession Act.

The evolution of women’s property rights under Hindu law has been one of the most transformative journeys in Indian succession jurisprudence. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 marked a decisive shift by recognising daughters as coparceners by birth and placing them on equal footing with sons in ancestral property governed by Mitakshara law. Despite this statutory clarity, courts continue to encounter attempts to dilute or defeat a daughter’s rightful share through pleas of oral partition, alleged family arrangements, or informal allotments said to have taken place prior to the statutory cut-off date.

In a significant judgment delivered in January 2026 in Amrika Bai v. Bhagwati Bai & Ors., decided by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, the Court reaffirmed a crucial principle that a mere plea of oral partition, unsupported by a registered instrument or a decree of a competent court, cannot be used to deny a daughter her coparcenary rights. The ruling not only applies the law laid down by the Supreme Court but also corrects the persistent misapplication of the saving clause under Section 6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Statutory Framework: Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Section 6, as substituted by the 2005 Amendment, fundamentally altered the position of daughters in a Joint Hindu Family governed by Mitakshara law. It provides that:

  • A daughter becomes a coparcener by birth, in the same manner as a son.
  • She enjoys the same rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property.
  • Her rights are independent of whether the father was alive on 9 September 2005.

The only limitation is contained in the proviso to Section 6(1), which saves:

“any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004.”

The proviso has often been invoked, sometimes incorrectly, to justify excluding daughters based on alleged pre-2004 oral partitions.

The Supreme Court’s Clarification: Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma

The law on this issue stands conclusively settled by the Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020). The Court held that:

  1. A daughter’s coparcenary right is by birth, not dependent on the father’s survival.
  2. The saving clause applies only to legally recognised partitions.
  3. Oral partition is not a recognised mode, except in the rarest cases where it is conclusively proved through public documents and conduct equivalent to a court decree.

The Supreme Court categorically ruled that a plea of oral partition based solely on oral evidence must be rejected outright.

Facts of the Chhattisgarh High Court Case

The dispute arose from a suit for partition filed by a daughter claiming her share in ancestral agricultural land. The key factual elements were:

  • The property was ancestral, inherited by the father from his own father.
  • The plaintiff was a daughter, thus a coparcener under amended Section 6.

The defendants pleaded that:

  • An oral partition had taken place years earlier.
  • The daughter had been given some land and a portion of the house.
  • A written note allegedly existed with the signatures of village elders.

Both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court accepted this plea, holding that the daughter’s claim was barred by the proviso to Section 6(1).

Issue

In second appeal, the High Court framed the substantial question:

  • Whether the courts below were justified in denying the daughter’s right by relying on the proviso to Section 6(1) without proof of a legally valid partition prior to 20 December 2004?

High Court’s Analysis and Reasoning

A. Daughters Are Coparceners by Birth

The Court reaffirmed that after the 2005 Amendment, daughters stand on the same footing as sons in coparcenary property. Once the property is admitted to be ancestral, the daughter’s right flows automatically by birth.

B. Scope of the Saving Clause Is Narrow

The Court clarified that the proviso to Section 6(1):

  • Does not recognise all past family arrangements.

Saves only:

  • Partitions effected by a registered partition deed, or
  • Partitions effected by a decree of a competent court

An informal or oral partition does not meet this threshold.

C. Oral Partition Plea Was Legally Unsustainable

In the present case:

  • No registered partition deed was produced.
  • No court decree existed.
  • The alleged village document had no statutory validity.
  • Evidence relied upon was purely oral.

Applying Vineeta Sharma, the Court held that such a plea cannot defeat a statutory right.

D. Allotment for Maintenance ≠ Partition

Even assuming that some land and a portion of the house were given to the daughter, the Court held that:

  • Such allotment appeared to be for maintenance or residence.
  • It did not amount to a complete and final partition.
  • It could not extinguish the daughter’s coparcenary rights.

E. Customary Divorce and Second Marriage Plea Rejected

The defendants also claimed that the father’s first marriage had been dissolved by custom. The Court reiterated settled law:

  • Custom must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved.
  • No such proof existed.
  • Hence, the plea was rejected.

Final Holding of the High Court

The High Court allowed the second appeal and held that:

  • Mere oral partition cannot defeat a daughter’s coparcenary share.
  • The courts below committed a perverse error in applying the proviso.
  • The daughter was entitled to her lawful share by partition

The judgment and decree of the lower courts were set aside, and a decree for partition was directed to be drawn.

Conclusion

The Chhattisgarh High Court has reaffirmed that a daughter’s coparcenary right under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be defeated by a mere plea of oral partition. Only a partition effected through a registered instrument or a court decree prior to 20 December 2004 is legally protected. Informal family arrangements or oral assertions have no force in law and cannot override the statutory equality conferred upon daughters by the 2005 amendment.

Important Link

Law Library: Notes and Study Material for LLB, LLM, Judiciary, and Entrance Exams

Pankaj Sinhmar

Pankaj Sinhmar

Pankaj is a practising Lawyer at Punjab & Haryana High Court.

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