Is Re-Entry Mandatory under the Domestic Violence Act after Choosing Another Residence?

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was enacted as a progressive social welfare law to ensure that women can live with dignity and without violence within the family. One of its most important safeguards is the right of residence under Sections 17 and 19, which protects a woman from unlawful dispossession and recognises her access to the shared household.

A practical issue often arises when a wife voluntarily shifts to another accommodation provided or arranged by the husband and later seeks to return to the earlier matrimonial home. The question is whether the law requires compulsory restoration to the same house or whether the obligation is fulfilled if a reasonable and suitable alternate residence is available.

The Delhi High Court in Reena Grover v. Ramesh Grover and Others (2026) examined this issue and held that the statute is meant to protect a woman from homelessness and insecurity, not to create an absolute right to occupy a particular property after she has consciously opted for another residence.

Facts of the Case

The petitioner wife, aged 81 years, had lived in the matrimonial home at Green Park, Delhi, since her marriage in 1964. Due to medical treatment, she shifted on 13.04.2023 to a Safdarjung Enclave property owned by her husband. Later, when she attempted to return to Green Park on 08.07.2023, she was allegedly denied entry.

She filed an application under Sections 19 and 23 of the DV Act seeking:

• Restoration of possession in the Green Park property,
• Restraining respondents from preventing her re-entry.

The Magistrate and the Appellate Court rejected her plea, holding that:

• She was already residing in a suitable house owned by her husband,
• Insisting on Green Park residence would cause further acrimony,
• The Safdarjung property constituted adequate alternate accommodation.

Statutory Framework of Residence Rights

Section 17 – Right to Reside in Shared Household

Section 17 declares that every woman in a domestic relationship has the right to reside in the shared household, irrespective of any title or ownership interest. She cannot be evicted except in accordance with law. This provision reflects constitutional values of dignity and security.

Section 19 – Residence Orders

Under Section 19, the Magistrate may:

• Restrain dispossession from the shared household.
• Direct restoration of possession.
• Order the respondent to secure alternate accommodation of a similar standard.

The emphasis is on ensuring shelter and safety, not on conferring proprietary rights over a specific house.

Definition of Shared Household

Section 2(s) defines a shared household as a place where the aggrieved woman lives or has lived in a domestic relationship. Courts have interpreted this broadly, yet the concept remains fact-sensitive and contextual, not perpetual.

Issue

• Does the DV Act compel re-entry into the matrimonial home when the wife has voluntarily shifted to another suitable residence provided by the husband?

Observations of the Delhi High Court

1. Purpose of the DV Act is Protective, Not Proprietary

The Court emphasised that the DV Act aims to protect women from being rendered homeless. It does not create an indefeasible right to occupy a particular property when alternate accommodation of the same standard is available.

2. Voluntary Shifting Breaks the Claim of Restoration

The petitioner herself admitted that she moved to Safdarjung Enclave for treatment. Her pleadings, affidavits, and police complaints mentioned that address as her residence. A nameplate bearing her name was also placed there. These circumstances showed a conscious relocation rather than a temporary displacement.

3. Shared Household Must Exist in Praesenti

Relying on Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2021), the Court held that a shared household must be subsisting in the present, not merely a historical memory. A house once shared does not remain so forever after voluntary separation.

4. Alternate Accommodation Satisfies Statutory Object

Since the husband had provided another house of similar standard and had no objection to her residing there, the object of Section 19 stood fulfilled. Compelling re-entry would convert the DV Act into an instrument for property disputes.

In Ajay Kumar Jain v. Baljeet Kaur Jain (2009), the Court ruled that the wife cannot insist on residing in a particular property if the husband is prepared to provide an adequate alternative residence, and such insistence cannot impede his lawful right to deal with the property.

5. No Domestic Violence in Denial of Re-Entry

Denial of return did not amount to economic abuse because:

• There was no forcible dispossession.
• She was not rendered roofless.
• Suitable shelter already existed.

Hence, the ingredients of domestic violence were absent.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court has clarified an important grey area by holding that re-entry into the matrimonial home is not mandatory under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act when the wife has consciously chosen and settled in another suitable residence provided by the husband. The law assures protection from homelessness and insecurity, but it does not confer upon the aggrieved woman an absolute right to dictate residence in a particular property or to override the husband’s legitimate property choices.

The ruling reinforces that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act is intended to function as a safeguard against abuse and deprivation rather than as a mechanism to settle property disputes. Courts will therefore examine the intention behind the shifting of residence, the existing living conditions, and the adequacy of the alternative accommodation before directing restoration to the earlier household.

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