13-Year Delay in Summary Trial Amounts to Abuse of Process: Allahabad High Court

In a significant ruling reinforcing the constitutional mandate of speedy justice, the Allahabad High Court has held that an extraordinary delay of nearly 13 years in concluding a summary trial under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 amounts to a gross abuse of the process of law. The decision, delivered by Justice Satya Veer Singh in Brijesh Kumar v. State of U.P. & Anr. (Application under Section 528 BNSS No. 50246 of 2025, decided on 20 February 2026), offers a comprehensive exposition on legislative intent, judicial discipline in summary trials, and the impermissibility of dilatory tactics that undermine Article 21 of the Constitution.

Factual Background

The controversy arose from a complaint filed on 01 February 2013 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act), alleging dishonour of a cheque. Despite the summary nature of the proceeding, the case meandered for over a decade. The accused’s statement under Section 313 CrPC (now Section 351 BNSS) was recorded in July 2021. Thereafter, repeated applications were filed seeking further opportunities to adduce defence evidence, particularly an expert report on handwriting/signature verification, without diligent follow-through.

Ultimately, by order dated 18 August 2025, the Trial Court closed the defence evidence after granting multiple reminders and a final opportunity. A subsequent application seeking recall of that order was rejected on 16 October 2025. Challenging these orders, the accused invoked Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) before the High Court, praying for quashing of the proceedings.

Issue

• Whether the extraordinary delay of 13 years in a Section 138 NI Act summary trial nullifies the accused’s right to seek reopening of defence evidence under Section 528 BNSS.

Statutory Framework Governing Summary Trials

Summary Trials under CrPC and BNSS

The Court traced the statutory lineage of summary trials from Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Sections 260–265) to Chapter XXII of the BNSS, 2023 (Sections 283–288). Summary trials are designed for the swift adjudication of less complex offences, balancing procedural fairness with efficiency.

Special Regime under the NI Act

Recognising the burgeoning docket of cheque dishonour cases, Parliament introduced Sections 143–145 into the NI Act via the 2002 Amendment. These provisions mandate:

• Summary trial as the default mode (Section 143);
• Day-to-day hearings and endeavour to conclude trials within six months of complaint filing;
• Evidence by affidavit to save judicial time (Section 145);
• Simplified service of summons (Section 144).

The High Court emphasised that these provisions are not directory platitudes but binding legislative commands aimed at preserving the credibility of commercial transactions and preventing harassment through prolonged criminal process.

Article 21 and the Right to Speedy Trial

A central pillar of the judgment is the reaffirmation that speedy trial is an intrinsic facet of Article 21. The Court observed that delays of such magnitude invert the purpose of law, converting legal process into punishment. Quoting classical maxims and Shakespeare’s warning:

“Defer no time; delays have dangerous ends”, the Court underscored that justice delayed is justice denied not only to the complainant but equally to the accused.

Reliance on Supreme Court Jurisprudence

The High Court extensively relied upon authoritative precedents of the Supreme Court of India, including:

1. Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663 – promoting early compounding;
2. Indian Bank Association v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 590
   – streamlining Section 138 trials;
3. Meters and Instruments (P) Ltd. v. Kanchan Mehta (2018) 1 SCC 560 – emphasising quasi-civil character;
4. In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases Under Section 138 NI Act (2021) 16 SCC 116 – issuing pan-India directions for expeditious disposal;
5. Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar (Criminal Appeal No. 1755 of 2010, decided 25.09.2025) – revisiting compounding guidelines and procedural reforms.

These authorities collectively recognise that Section 138 proceedings are quasi-criminal, primarily remedial rather than punitive, and must not be allowed to languish indefinitely.

Assessment of the Accused’s Conduct

In fact, the High Court found that:

• The accused sought expert evidence but failed to pursue it diligently even after sample signatures were obtained in April 2023;
• Multiple reminders and a final opportunity were granted by the Trial Court;
• The application for reopening defence was moved belatedly in September 2025, long after closure of evidence and completion of examinations.

Such conduct, in the Court’s view, reflected procrastination rather than prejudice, and reopening the trial at that stage would defeat the very purpose of summary procedure.

Abuse of Process: Meaning and Application

The Court characterised the 13-year pendency as a “stark exemplification of inordinate delay” amounting to abuse of the process of the Court. Abuse of process arises when procedural tools are used not to vindicate rights but to obstruct, delay, or harass. In cheque dishonour cases, constituting a substantial percentage of trial court pendency, such abuse has systemic consequences, clogging dockets and eroding public confidence.

The Court categorically held that Section 528 BNSS cannot be invoked to perpetuate delay or undo well-reasoned trial court orders that enforce procedural discipline.

Outcome of the Case

The High Court:

• Refused to quash the impugned orders dated 16.10.2025 and the underlying proceedings;
• Held that sufficient opportunities had already been granted to the accused;
• Directed that such delayed matters be expedited and disposed of within statutory timelines;
• Ordered the judgment to be placed before the concerned District & Sessions Judge for administrative compliance.

Conclusion

The Allahabad High Court’s decision stands as a robust reaffirmation that summary trials are meant to be summary in substance, not merely in name. A 13-year delay in a cheque dishonour case, the Court held, is antithetical to legislative intent, constitutional guarantees, and the credibility of the justice system. By refusing to reopen closed stages of trial and by condemning procrastination as abuse of process, the judgment sends a clear signal: the criminal process cannot be weaponised through delay.

For litigants, lawyers, and trial courts alike, this ruling is a timely reminder that speedy justice is not an aspirational slogan but a binding constitutional command, one that must be honoured in letter and spirit, especially in summary proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act.

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