Is Mere Inconvenience Enough to Seek Case Transfer? Supreme Court Evaluates the Limits

The Supreme Court’s 2025 ruling in Golla Naraesh Kumar Yadav v. Kotak Mahindra Bank marks a pivotal moment in transfer jurisprudence under the NI Act, where the Court recognised that inconvenience in attending trial is not merely a matter of distance, but a factor capable of affecting access to justice, legal defence, and fair trial rights.

By transferring the proceedings and referring the larger legal issue for authoritative determination, the judgment signals a shift from rigid territorial formalism toward a more equitable, fairness-oriented approach in Section 138 prosecutions.

Background — How the Dispute Originated

The petitioners, small-scale cotton traders operating in Adoni, Andhra Pradesh, had obtained overdraft and loan facilities amounting to ₹10 crore from Kotak Mahindra Bank. When repayment allegedly failed, the account was classified as NPA. Multiple dispute proceedings ensued — under SARFAESI, before the DRT Hyderabad, and later before the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

Meanwhile, cheques issued by the borrowers were presented by the bank not in Andhra Pradesh, but at Chandigarh. Upon dishonour, criminal complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh.

The borrower-accused then approached the Supreme Court seeking the transfer of proceedings to Andhra Pradesh.

Their argument was simple yet fundamental: the trial is too far, too costly, and too inaccessible, making defence preparation unfairly difficult.

Petitioners’ Stand — Distance, Language & Legal Access as Real Hardship

The accused asserted that the continuation of the trial in Chandigarh results in grave prejudice because:

1. All business transactions occurred in Adoni, AP
2. All documents and defence witnesses are located there
3. Travelling more than 2000 km repeatedly is impractical
4. Legal representation becomes unaffordable and inaccessible
5. Related legal proceedings are already pending in Hyderabad/Andhra Pradesh

The Court acknowledged that such distance is not a trivial concern. Importantly, it recognised that Section 138 NI Act cases are personal wrongs, not offences against society, and thus transfer does not shake public interest as it might in murder or corruption trials.

Bank’s Response — Jurisdiction Is Statutory, Convenience Is Secondary

Kotak Mahindra Bank relied on:

Section 142(2) NI Act (post-2015 amendment) — which determines territorial jurisdiction based on the branch where the cheque is presented for collection. Therefore, since the cheques were processed in Chandigarh, the prosecution lies there.

The Bank argued that inconvenience is not a ground for transfer unless expedience for justice is established, citing Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. where mere inconvenience was rejected as insufficient.

Thus, even if the accused is far away, jurisdiction cannot shift merely for comfort.

The Governing Legal Principles – How the Supreme Court Evaluates Transfers

Under Section 406 CrPC (now Section 446 BNSS), transfer is permissible only if expedient for the ends of justice. Earlier case law (notably Nahar Singh Yadav v. UOI) laid down five guiding circumstances:

Significantly — and here lies the turning point — inconvenience is not irrelevant; rather, it becomes relevant when disproportionate or when parties are unequal in resources.

Emerging Judicial Doubt — Is Inconvenience Really “Not Enough”?

In Shri Sendhur Agro (2025), a different bench held:

“Mere inconvenience or hardship is not sufficient to transfer cases… the matter must fall within recognised exceptional circumstances.”

However, the present bench — while respecting precedent — pointed out a vital nuance:

Parameter (iii) itself recognises inconvenience as a factor when disproportionate or when equality of arms is disturbed.

In the present case:

• Corporate complainant = financially powerful
• Accused = small trader, limited resources
• Trial 2000 km away = real barrier to defence

Inconvenience becomes injustice when it kills the right to fair trial.

A Key Observation — NI Act Accused Already Faces Statutory Burden

• Section 139 of the NI Act presumes guilt.
• Section 145-146 of the NI Act grants an evidentiary advantage to the complainant.

So the drawer-accused must actively rebut, requiring documents, witnesses, and ongoing legal interaction with counsel. If the trial court is geographically out of reach, defence collapses.

The Court acknowledged this imbalance explicitly — this recognition may redefine future jurisprudence.

The Outcome — Transfer Allowed, Larger Bench Reference Made

The Supreme Court held that:

• Retaining the case in Chandigarh would burden the accused disproportionately
• The Bank, being a national institution, would face minimal hardship if the trial were shifted
• However, instead of Adoni, Hyderabad was chosen as a balanced midpoint since related DRT matters were already pending there

Finally, because this ruling diverged from Shri Sendhur Agro, the issue is now referred to the Chief Justice to constitute a Larger Bench — meaning the law is moving, not settled.

Conclusion

Mere inconvenience may not automatically justify transfer — but when such inconvenience cripples defence, undermines equality of arms, or places an individual at a fundamental disadvantage, it ceases to be “mere”. Instead, it becomes a direct threat to the right to a fair trial.

The Supreme Court opened the doctrinal window for recognising relative hardship, socio-economic imbalance, and accessibility of justice as real determinants in territorial transfer jurisprudence.

As we now await the Larger Bench decision, one foundational shift is already visible:

Justice is not only about where the case legally can be tried —
it is also about where it can be fairly fought.

Important Link

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