Delhi HC Narrows Tenant’s Objections in Bonafide Need Evictions

Delhi High Court has once again clarified the scope of tenant objections in cases of eviction filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”). In H.S. Banka v. Mohan Lal (RC.REV. 49/2018, decided on October 8, 2025), Justice Saurabh Banerjee held that a landlord is not required to disclose the exact nature of the business he proposes to commence to claim eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement.

The judgment reaffirms that the landlord is the best judge of his needs, and the tenant cannot dictate how the landlord should utilise his property.

Background of the Case

The dispute originated when H.S. Banka, the landlord, filed an eviction petition on September 26, 2011 under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act against Mohan Lal, his tenant, in respect of Shop No. 2, Property No. F-171/4, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi, claiming that the premises were required bona fide to start his own business.

The landlord, a senior citizen with no other source of income, asserted that he wished to use the shop to generate livelihood. He had purchased the property from Smt. Shakuntala Devi, the previous owner who had orally inducted the tenant.

The tenant challenged the eviction petition by filing an application for leave to defend, alleging that:

• The landlord was merely an attorney of the previous owner and not the true owner.
• The landlord had not disclosed the exact nature of the business he proposed to start.
• He possessed other commercial properties and was attempting to evict tenants unjustly.

Although the Additional Rent Controller (ARC) acknowledged the landlord-tenant relationship and noted that the tenant was estopped from disputing ownership under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it found that the landlord had failed to specify the nature of his proposed business. On this ground, leave to defend was granted on April 11, 2012.

Following a full trial, the ARC dismissed the eviction petition on November 3, 2017, holding that the landlord’s bona fide requirement had not been proved due to the “vagueness” of his intended business.

Aggrieved, the landlord approached the High Court under Section 25-B(8) read with Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.

Arguments Before the High Court

Landlord’s Submissions

Counsel for the landlord, Mr Ajaya Bhardwaj, contended that the ARC erred in imposing an unnecessary requirement to specify the nature of the intended business. He relied on three pivotal precedents:

1. Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 119: It is sufficient for a landlord to assert bona fide need; the tenant cannot question its reasonableness.
2. Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353: The landlord is the best judge of his own requirements.
3. Noor Mohammad v. Kanta Aggarwal (RC.REV. 400/2017, Delhi HC) – Eviction on bona fide grounds was upheld even when the landlord had other shops in the same building.

He further submitted that the High Court had, in H.S. Banka v. Hari Krishna Sharma (RC.REV. 43/2018), allowed eviction under nearly identical circumstances involving an adjacent shop. Thus, consistency required similar treatment in the present case.

Tenant’s Submissions

The tenant’s counsel, Mr Gaurav Bhardwaj, argued that:

• The landlord’s failure to state what business he intended to start rendered the claim vague and insincere.
• During cross-examination, the landlord admitted, “I will decide about the nature of business to be run by me in the tenanted property in question, after it is vacated by the respondent.”
• This statement demonstrated a lack of genuine intention.

The tenant also relied on:

• Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Shrivastava (AIR 2001 SC 803) – The bona fide need must exist continuously from the date of filing till final disposal.
• Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222) – Courts must ensure that landlords do not seek eviction on speculative or pretextual grounds.

Observations of the Delhi High Court

1. No Statutory Requirement to Disclose Nature of Business

The Court held that the DRC Act does not require a landlord to specify the exact nature of the business he intends to establish. The ARC’s insistence on this point, therefore, had no legal foundation. Quoting from Balwant Singh Chaudhary v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (2004) 1 RCR (Rent) 487, the Court observed:

“It is not necessary for the landlord to plead and prove the specific business which he wants to set up in non-residential premises in respect of which eviction is sought.”

The underlying rationale, the Court stated, is that business decisions are fluid and may evolve over time and in response to market dynamics. Requiring specificity would unfairly restrict the landlord’s flexibility and could even lead to punitive consequences under Section 19 of the DRC Act if he later changes his business plan.

2. ARC’s Approach Contrary to Legislative Intent

Justice Banerjee criticised the ARC for dismissing the eviction petition “in a summary manner” without engaging with the substantive evidence or the legislative purpose of Section 14(1)(e). The Rent Control framework seeks to balance tenant protection with landlords’ right to reasonable use of property. By reading an additional requirement into the law, the ARC disrupted this balance.

3. Admission of Landlord–Tenant Relationship

The Court noted that the tenant had admitted the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship in his written statement and even acknowledged paying rent to the petitioner. Such an admission, coupled with the ARC’s earlier order recognising this relationship, barred the tenant from questioning ownership under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. Hence, this issue was conclusively settled.

4. Absence of Alternative Accommodation

The landlord had categorically stated that he possessed no other “reasonable and suitable commercial accommodation” for running his business. The tenant’s allegation of multiple properties was unsupported by any documentary proof. In cross-examination, the tenant admitted, “I have placed nothing on record to show that the petitioner owns any property outside Delhi.”

This reinforced the genuineness of the landlord’s claim.

5. Presumption in Favour of Bona Fide Need

Citing Sarla Ahuja and Prativa Devi, the Court reiterated that once a landlord establishes a prima facie case for eviction, the presumption tilts in his favour. It is neither for the tenant nor the court to suggest alternative adjustments or question the landlord’s wisdom in determining his own needs.

Justice Banerjee quoted approvingly:

“When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide… It is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself.”

6. Precedential Consistency

The Court emphasised that this case mirrored the earlier decision in H.S. Banka v. Hari Krishna Sharma (RC.REV. 43/2018), where the same landlord had sought eviction of another tenant from the adjacent shop. There, too, the High Court had set aside the ARC’s refusal, holding that “vagueness regarding use” cannot defeat bona fide need. Applying parity of reasoning, the Court extended the same principle here.

7. Revisional Jurisdiction and Judicial Restraint

The High Court underscored the limited scope of interference under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act. Citing Sarla Ahuja and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua (2022) 6 SCC 30), Justice Banerjee stated that the High Court cannot re-evaluate factual findings unless the ARC’s conclusions are perverse or based on illegality. In this case, the ARC’s reasoning suffered from both infirmities.

Decision

Delhi High Court allowed the revision petition, set aside the eviction dismissal, and directed the tenant to vacate Shop No. 2, F-171/4, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi, within six months as provided under Section 14(7) of the DRC Act. No order as to costs was passed.

Key Legal Principles Reaffirmed

1. Bona Fide Requirement Must Be Genuine, Not Specified

The Court reaffirmed that a landlord needs only to demonstrate a sincere, bona fide intention to use the property for self-employment or personal occupation. He is not required to specify the nature of the intended business.

2. Tenant Cannot Dictate the Landlord’s Use

Once bona fide need is established, tenants cannot question the landlord’s business plans or suggest alternative accommodations. Courts have consistently held that “the landlord is the best judge of his needs.”

3. Burden of Proof Lies on the Tenant to Disprove

Where the landlord’s assertions remain uncontroverted, as in this case, the presumption of genuineness stands. Mere allegations of other properties or ulterior motives are insufficient without proof.

4. Continuity of Need

While Gaya Prasad mandates that the bona fide need should persist throughout the proceedings, the High Court found no evidence of discontinuity. The landlord consistently maintained his desire to start a business for a livelihood.

5. Judicial Deference to Legislative Intent

The ruling reinforces that rent control laws are not designed to indefinitely freeze landlord rights. Courts must avoid creating additional procedural hurdles beyond the statute’s express requirements.

Conclusion

Delhi High Court’s judgment in H.S. Banka v. Mohan Lal (2025) is a robust reaffirmation of landlord autonomy in bona fide need evictions. By holding that a landlord need not disclose the precise nature of intended business, the Court has reinforced the principle that genuineness, not specificity, is the test of bona fide requirement.

This ruling harmonises with decades of jurisprudence from Prativa Devi to Abid-Ul-Islam, emphasising that courts must not micro-manage landlords’ use of their property. It also fortifies judicial efficiency under the DRC Act, discouraging dilatory tenant objections and promoting a fair balance between protection and property rights.

Ultimately, the judgment marks another step toward rationalising rent control litigation — ensuring that bona fide landlords are not entangled in endless procedural scrutiny, and tenants’ defences remain grounded in substance, not speculation.

This ruling narrows the scope of tenant objections in eviction matters and aligns with long-standing jurisprudence emphasising judicial restraint in questioning a landlord’s genuine need.

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