Supreme Court Suggests ‘Romeo–Juliet’ Clause in POCSO for Consensual Adolescent Relationships

The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) was enacted as a stringent, child-centric legislation to combat sexual abuse, exploitation, and trafficking of minors. Its objectives are unquestionably compelling: to provide a robust legal framework that prioritises child safety, dignity, and justice through stringent punishments and child-friendly procedures.

However, over a decade of judicial experience has revealed a complex and troubling by-product of the Act’s absolute age-based criminalisation framework. Courts across India have repeatedly encountered cases where consensual romantic relationships between adolescents are prosecuted as serious sexual offences, often at the behest of disapproving parents. These prosecutions blur the line between protection and punishment and raise profound constitutional, social, and criminological concerns.

In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr. (2026), the Supreme Court, while adjudicating issues relating to bail jurisdiction and age determination under the POCSO Act, went a step further. In a significant post-script, the Court expressly recommended legislative consideration of a “Romeo–Juliet” clause—a close-in-age exemption—to prevent the misuse of POCSO in cases of consensual adolescent relationships.

Understanding the POCSO Framework: Absolute Criminalisation

Statutory Scheme

Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines a child as any person below the age of eighteen years. Consent is rendered legally irrelevant; any sexual activity involving a minor automatically constitutes an offence, irrespective of voluntariness or mutuality.

This approach is reinforced by:

• Sections 3 & 7, criminalising penetrative and non-penetrative sexual acts,
• Section 29, introducing a presumption of guilt against the accused,
• Special Courts, fast-track procedures, and stringent bail conditions.

The legislative design deliberately excludes discretion, operating on the premise that children lack legal capacity to consent.

The Judicial Reality: When Protection Turns Punitive

Despite its protective intent, courts have repeatedly flagged systemic misuse of POCSO in cases involving:

• Adolescents in romantic relationships,
• Minor age gaps (often 1–3 years),
• Voluntary elopement or consensual intimacy,
• Parental disapproval leading to criminal prosecution.

Such cases frequently result in:

• Arrest and incarceration of young men,
• Disruption of education and employment,
• Social stigma and prolonged trials,
• Criminal branding is disproportionate to the conduct involved.

High Courts have increasingly granted bail or quashed proceedings in such cases, but only after considerable hardship to the accused.

Supreme Court’s Intervention in State of U.P. v. Anurudh

Context of the Case

The case arose from a POCSO prosecution alleging sexual offences against a minor. While the principal issues before the Supreme Court concerned:

• The scope of bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC (Section 483 BNSS), and
  
• The legality of High Court directions mandating medical age determination at the bail stage,

the Court went beyond the immediate lis to address a systemic concern.

The Post-Script: A Judicial Policy Signal

In a necessitated post-script, the Supreme Court candidly acknowledged the recurring misuse of POCSO in consensual adolescent relationships and observed that the law, as it stands, fails to distinguish between exploitation and mutual intimacy among peers.

The Court recommended that Parliament consider introducing a “Romeo–Juliet” clause, similar to those in several foreign jurisdictions, to exempt consensual sexual activity between adolescents who are close in age.

Though non-binding, such postscripts are jurisprudentially significant. They reflect constitutional unease and often catalyse legislative reform.

Cases Relied Upon by the Supreme Court

1. Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 263: The Court reaffirmed that the procedure for age determination under the Juvenile Justice law applies equally to child victims, not only juveniles in conflict with law. The hierarchy of proof gives primacy to documentary evidence, and medical tests are resorted to only in the absence of reliable documents.
2. Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489: This case was cited to clarify that documents like school certificates raise only a rebuttable presumption of age, and courts may order further inquiry if credibility is in doubt. The presumption is not conclusive.
3. Parag Bhati (Juvenile) v. State of U.P. (2016) 12 SCC 744: The Court relied on this precedent to caution against a casual or mechanical acceptance of age-related documents, especially in serious offences. Courts must carefully scrutinise the genuineness of such records.
4. Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of U.P. (2022) 8 SCC 602: This judgment was cited to explain the difference between a prima facie age inquiry by a criminal court and a final age determination by the Juvenile Justice Board, and that ossification tests are only guiding tools, not conclusive proof.
5. State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (2005) 8 SCC 21: The Court reiterated settled bail jurisprudence, holding that bail courts must confine themselves to assessing prima facie case, gravity of offence, likelihood of absconding or tampering, and must not conduct a mini-trial.
6. State v. M. Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251: This decision was relied upon to hold that courts exercising bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC (Section 483 BNSS) cannot issue sweeping administrative or systemic directions, even if well-intentioned, as such directions exceed statutory limits
   

Romeo–Juliet Clause Concept

A “Romeo–Juliet clause” is commonly described as a close-in-age exemption. In jurisdictions that recognise it, statutory rape laws remain strict against adults and exploiters, but the law creates a limited exception where:

• both persons are adolescents (or one is a “young adult” just above the age threshold),
• the relationship is consensual, and
• the age gap is small (for example, 2–5 years, depending on the model).

The purpose is not to normalise child sexual activity, but to prevent a legal outcome where two teenagers in a mutually voluntary relationship are treated as perpetrator and victim in the same way as a child predator case.

The Supreme Court’s recent remarks indicate that India’s current “one-size-fits-all” approach under POCSO can create disproportionate criminalisation in close-in-age consensual cases, without improving child safety.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s suggestion of a Romeo–Juliet clause in POCSO, articulated in State of U.P. v. Anurudh & Anr. (2026) represents a jurisprudential watershed. Rooted in lived judicial experience and constitutional principles, it acknowledges that absolute criminalisation of adolescent intimacy can produce injustice without enhancing protection.

The Court has not diluted POCSO. It has instead invited Parliament to recalibrate the law so that it continues to protect children from abuse while avoiding the needless criminalisation of young love. In doing so, the judgment reinforces a foundational principle of Indian constitutionalism: the law must protect without destroying, and punish without dehumanising.

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